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1. Introduction
We investigate the following problem of construction of a social decision rule. Given a set of n agents, each
agent evaluates alternatives from a ﬁnite set X using complete and transitive preferences, and we look for a
complete and transitive social preference over the alternatives. This kind of aggregation has been considered in
many publications, beginning with the seminal work by Arrow [6]. In order to solve the problem, two ways have
been in general proposed. Arrow’s kind of axiomatics can be described as the local aggregation [1]; in other words,
the aggregation is done on the basis of pairwise comparisons. Another way is to use certain non-local procedures,
e.g., positional rules, for which axiomatic approaches have been developed rather poorly [8, 9]. On the other hand,
an application of the Borda rule is often not adequate, since any summation of ranks has a compensatory nature: a
low evaluation of some alternative by one agent can be compensated by a high evaluation of another agent. Thus,
if we would like to take carefully into account low evaluations of alternatives, the Borda rule or its counterparts
cannot be used.
We present an axiomatic construction of the new aggregation procedure called the ‘threshold rule’. The axioms
used are Pairwise compensation, Pareto domination, Non-compensatory threshold and Contraction ([2]–[5], [7]).
The Pairwise compensation axiom means that if all agents but two evaluate two alternatives equally, and the
two agents put ‘mutually inverse’ grades, then the two alternatives have the same rank in the social decision.
The Pareto domination axiom states that if the grades of all agents for one alternative are not less than for
the second alternative and the grade of at least one agent for the ﬁrst alternative is strictly greater than that of the
second one, then in the social ranking the ﬁrst alternative has a higher rank than the second one.
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The problem of axiomatic and algorithmic constructions of the threshold decision making is studied in the case when individual
opinions are given as m-graded strict preferences (with m ≥ 3). It is shown that the only rule satisfying the introduced axioms is
the threshold rule. Two explicit algorithms are presented: the ordering algorithm, under which the vector-grades of alternatives
are successively written out, and an enumerating social decision function corresponding to the natural order of the weak order
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The Non-compensatory threshold and Contraction axiom reveals the very idea of the threshold aggregation
(we illustrate it for the case of three-graded preferences, that is, when the ranks 1, 2, 3 mean ‘bad’, ‘average’ and
‘good’, respectively, cf. [4, 5]): if at least one agent evaluates an alternative as ‘bad’, then, no matter how many
‘good’ grades it admits, in the social ranking this alternative has lower rank than any alternative evaluated as
‘average’ by all agents. In this context the Contraction means that if for two alternatives the evaluations of some
agent are equal, then the agent may be excluded from the consideration when the social ranking is constructed,
and the social decision is achieved by the remaining agents’ evaluations.
We show that the threshold rule is the only rule satisfying the three axioms. The threshold rule aggregates
individual preferences as follows (for m = 3): ﬁrst, if the number of ‘bad’ evaluations in the ﬁrst alternative is
greater than that in the second one, then the ﬁrst alternative has lower rank in the social ranking; if the numbers of
‘bads’ for both alternatives are equal, then the comparison is made with respect to ‘average’ evaluations.
Since individual opinions are orderings as well as a social decision, the next question is whether it is possible to
deﬁne the rank of an alternative using its ranks in the individual orderings. We present an aﬃrmative answer to this
question showing that it can indeed be done by using an explicit aggregation function deﬁned in a combinatorial
way. This function has the following nice features: the value of this function on an alternative is the ordinal
number of this alternative in the axiomatic ranking, which in turn is equal to the ordinal number of the weak
order equivalence class of the alternative and at the same time the ordinal number of the ordered vector grades
of the alternative with respect to the algorithmic order. This gives us the ability to work with precise numerical
expressions in evaluation of equivalence classes as well as the indiﬀerence classes and restore the vector grades of
the alternative from the knowledge of its ordinal number as the result of the social decision. This is a new aspect
of our theory as compared to the mostly axiomatic approach generally adopted in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 adresses axiomatics of social decision functions. Section 3 treats
the algorithms. Section 4 concludes.
2. Axiomatics
Let X be a ﬁnite set of alternatives, N = {1, 2, . . . , n} a set of n ≥ 2 agents, M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} the set of ordered
grades, 1 < 2 < . . . < m, with m ≥ 3, Mn the set of all n-dimensional vectors with components from M and
X̂ = {x̂ : x ∈ X} ⊂ Mn an individual (evaluation) proﬁle of X, where x̂ = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Mn with each xi ∈ M.
The problem is to rank the elements of X making use of the individual proﬁle X̂ of X. By a ranking of X we
mean a complete and transitive binary relation on X.
Given x ∈ X and j ∈ M, we denote by v j(x) = |{i ∈ N : xi = j}| the number of grades j corresponding to x
(equivalently, in the vector x̂). Note that
∑m
j=1 v j(x) = n for all x ∈ X.
We look for a social decision function ϕ : X → R satisfying the following m axioms ([2, 3, 7]).
Axiom 1 (Pairwise compensation): if x, y ∈ X and v j(x) = v j(y) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, then ϕ(x) = ϕ(y).
Axiom 2 (Pareto domination): if x, y ∈ X and x̂  ŷ in Mn, then ϕ(x) > ϕ(y), where x̂  ŷ in Mn means that
xi ≥ yi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and xi0 > yi0 for some 1 ≤ i0 ≤ n.
Axiom k for k = 3, . . . ,m (Non-compensatory threshold and Contraction): if x, y ∈ X, v j(x) = v j(y) for all
1 ≤ j ≤ m− k (no condition if k = m), vm−k+1(x)+ 1 = vm−k+1(y), v j(x) = 0 for all m− k + 3 ≤ j ≤ m, v j(y) = 0 for
all m − k + 2 ≤ j ≤ m − 1 and vm(y)  0, then ϕ(x) > ϕ(y).
Setting v(x) = (v1(x), . . . , vm−1(x)) for x ∈ X, we denote by v(x)∠v(y) the property of x, y ∈ X meaning that
there exists a 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1 such that vk(x) < vk(y) and v j(x) = v j(y) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 (no second condition
if k = 1), which will be called the threshold rule for comparison of x and y (note that ∠ is the lexicographic
order on Rm−1). We say that a binary relation P ⊂ X × X is generated by the threshold rule provided that
P = {(x, y) ∈ X × X : v(x)∠v(y)}. The relation P is a weak order on X, i.e., it is transitive ((x, y) ∈ P and (y, z) ∈ P
imply (x, z) ∈ P), irreﬂexive ((x, x)  P) and negatively transitive ((x, y)  P and (y, z)  P imply (x, z)  P).
It is well known (e.g., [1]) that a weak order P on X is completely characterized by the family of its equiv-
alence classes, whose construction is recalled now. Set X′1 = π(X) where, given A ⊂ X, π(A) = {x ∈ A :¬∃ y ∈ A such that (y, x) ∈ P}. Inductively, if  ≥ 2 and nonempty subsets X′1, . . . , X′−1 of X are already deﬁned,
we put X = π
(
X \ (⋃−1k=1 X′k)). Since X is ﬁnite, we have X = ⋃s=1 X′ for some positive integer s. Setting
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X = X′s−+1 for  = 1, . . . , s, the disjoint collection {X}s=1 is said to be the family of equivalence classes of the
weak order P, and has the following characterization property: (x, y) ∈ P if and only if there exist 1 ≤ 1 < 2 ≤ s
such that x ∈ X2 and y ∈ X1 .
We say that a function ϕ : X → R is coherent with the family {X}s=1 of equivalence classes of weak order P
if, given x, y ∈ X, ϕ(x) > ϕ(y) if and only if there exist 1 ≤ 1 < 2 ≤ s such that x ∈ X2 and y ∈ X1 .
The ﬁrst main result is the following
Theorem 1. A social decision function ϕ : X → R satisﬁes Axioms 1 through m if and only if it is coherent
with the family of equivalence classes of the weak order P generated by the threshold rule v(x)∠v(y).
3. Algorithms
We deﬁne the indiﬀerence relation I on X by (x, y) ∈ I whenever v(x) = v(y), x, y ∈ X, i.e., when the vector
grades x̂ and ŷ can be transformed to each other by permutations of their coordinates. Clearly, I is an equivalence
relation on X. We denote by I[x] = {y ∈ X : (y, x) ∈ I} the indiﬀerence class of x ∈ X and by X/I the set of all
indiﬀerence classes. Given x ∈ X, we denote by x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗n) ∈ Mn the unique vector with x∗1 ≤ x∗2 ≤ . . . ≤ x∗n,
which is obtained from x̂ by a permutation of its coordinates. Note that v j(x) = |{i ∈ N : x∗i = j}| for all j ∈ M. We
call x∗ the monotone representative of x and denote by X∗ the set of all monotone representatives and by Mn∗ the
subset of Mn of all vectors, whose coordinates are ordered in ascending order, so that, X∗ ⊂ Mn∗. It can be shown
that ([2])
|X/I| = |X∗| ≤ |Mn∗| =
(










k!(n − k)! ,
and {X}s=1 = X/I, whence s = |X∗|.
In what follows we assume that X∗ = Mn∗, and so, s =
(




We also note that the binary relation R on X given by R = P ∪ I is complete and transitive (i.e., it is a ranking
of X).
We deﬁne the algorithmic order on Mn∗ as follows: write out one by one a string of vectors of the form:
(1, . . . , 1︸︷︷︸
n − n1
, 2, . . . , 2︸︷︷︸
n1 − n2
, 3, . . . , 3︸︷︷︸
n2 − n3
, . . . , m − 1, . . . ,m − 1︸︷︷︸
nm−2 − nm−1
, m, . . . ,m︸︷︷︸
nm−1
) (1)
(the numbers under the braces being the lengths of the underbraced subvectors) in such a way that n1 assumes
successively the values 0, 1, . . . , n, and if n1 is ﬁxed, n2 assumes successively the values 0, 1, . . . , n1, and if n2
is ﬁxed, n3 assumes successively the values 0, 1, . . . , n2, and so on, and ﬁnally, if n1, n2, . . . , nm−2 are ﬁxed, nm−1
assumes successively the values 0, 1, . . . , nm−2. Since the algorithmic order is linear, to each vector x∗ ∈ X∗ = Mn∗
corresponds a unique natural number alg(x∗), which is deﬁned as the ordinal number of x∗ with respect to the
algorithmic order on Mn∗.
Our second main result is as follows.
Theorem 2. (x, y) ∈ P or, equivalently, x ∈ X2 and y ∈ X1 for some 1 ≤ 1 < 2 ≤ s if and only if
alg(x∗) > alg(y∗).
Note that, since each vector x∗ ∈ Mn∗ can be uniquely written in the form (1) with n j = n j(x∗) depending
on x∗, 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, and satisfying 0 ≤ n j(x∗) ≤ n j−1(x∗) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1 and n0(x∗) = n, then setting
n(x∗) = (n1(x∗), . . . , nm−1(x∗)), we ﬁnd that alg(x∗) > alg(y∗) if and only if n(y∗)∠ n(x∗) in Rm−1.
Finally, we deﬁne explicitly the social decision function Φ, which characterizes the equivalence classes of P,
the indiﬀerence classes of I and the algorithmic order on Mn∗, according to the rule:









, x ∈ X,






= 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 2.
Our third main result is the following
Theorem 3. The function Φ has the properties:
(1) Φ maps X onto {1, 2, . . . , s} with s =
(
n + m − 1
m − 1
)
and satisﬁes Axioms 1 through m;
(2) Φ(x) = alg(x∗) for all x ∈ X;
(3) X = {x ∈ X : Φ(x) = } for all 1 ≤  ≤ s;
(4) I[x] = XΦ(x) for all x ∈ X;
(5) given 1 ≤  ≤ s, we have: x ∈ X, or Φ(x) = , if and only if there exists a uniquely determined collection
of numbers n1, n2, . . . , nm−2 satisfying 0 ≤ n j ≤ n j−1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 2 with n0 = n and L + 1 ≤





, such that v j(x) = n j−1 − n j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 2,
vm−1(x) = nm−2 + L + 1 −  and vm(x) =  − L − 1.
4. Conclusion
We have considered a model of aggregation, in which ‘low’ evaluations of agents were taken into account
extremely carefully (in a diﬀerent interpretation, ‘punished’ rather severely), since low grades cannot in any way
be compensated by high grades of the other agents. This is exactly the situation when the quality or perfectness
of alternatives are of great value and interest. On the other hand, it is clear that an aggregation procedure can be
made taking carefully into account high grades of agents: this is the case when we are interested in at least one
good feature of alternatives. It is exactly the dual model to that considered above, and it has all advantages of the
dual model including the construction of a social decision function similar to Φ from Section 3.
Yet, one more remark ought to be made concerning an interpretation of the Non-compensatory property. Un-
der this property, any agent giving a low grade to an alternative puts it down in the social decision as compared
to an alternative with average grades. Thus, marginal opinions can strongly inﬂuence the social decision. Corre-
spondingly, it opens the door to a rather high manipulability of the threshold rule.
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